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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
CHARLES STEVEN ARCHULETTA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15919 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, CHARLES STEVEN ARCHULETTA, appeals from 
a conviction of Forcible Sodomy in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, CHA..~ES STEVEN ARCHULETTA, was charged 
with Rape, a Felony of the Second Degree, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-402 (1953 as amended) and Forcible Sodomy, a 
Felony of the Second Degree in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-403 (1953 as amended). At jury trial appellant was acquitted 
of the charge of Rape, but found guilty of the charge of Forcible 
Sodomy. Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the 
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years for that conviction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and judg-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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ment rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third Judicial 
District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State alleged that Michelle Christiansen was raped 
by appellant on September 27, 1977, and that shortly thereafter 
was forced to engage in sodomy with him at an apartment somewhere 
on the east side of Salt Lake City. Seventeen year-old Michelle 
Christiansen testified at trial that at approximately 5:30 or 
6:00 p.m. on the evening of the 26th of September, 1977, while 
riding with three of her female friends in the area of 600 South 
and 900 East in Salt Lake City, she, along with the others, en-
gaged in a conversation with appellant while he was driving 
another car going the same direction. She testified that the 
appellant asked herself and her friends if they all wanted to go 
to a party, and they agreed. Appellant drove his truck to the 
location of the party and rode with the girls to one Diana Visick's 
house to change into other clothing. Michelle and Lisa Don 
Thornwall drove appellant back towards the party in Diana's 
car. Along the way they stopped at a grocery store to buy beer. 
Michelle testified that at the party she, along with the others, 
drank beer and that there was marijuana being smoked. 
A while later Lisa Don, the appellant, and Michelle 
agreed to leave the party and drove to Gerrard Avenue, a location 
one block behind the State Capitol Building, where the three of 
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them sat in the car for a considerable period of time, talking 
and drinking beer (T. 19,38). Some time after the three indi-
viduals had been parked at Gerrard Avenue, all three individuals 
took a pill or capsule. Michelle also testified that she had 
consumed two to two and a half beers, maybe (T. 39). The three 
sat for a while longer talking. During this time appellant kissed 
Lisa (T. 20) and also Michelle. They then decided to leave 
Gerrard Avenue. Lisa Don decided that she wanted to go home (T.20). 
She dropped Michelle and appellant off at the appellant's mother's 
place. Appellant indicated he would be meeting with his sister to 
get a car and that he could take Michelle home after they had gone 
out to eat breakfast (T. 21). 
After a few minutes when the car had not arrived, Michelle 
asked to use the lavatory and the appellant walked with her around 
the corner to another apartment. He let her in the apartment, she 
used the bathroom, and the appellant indicated he was going to see 
if his sister was back with the car (T. 22). The prosecutrix 
testified that she then passed out (T. 23) and that she doesn't 
remember anything until she saw appellant standing by the doorway. 
She testified that she got up off the couch (T.23) where she had been 
asleep and walked over to where he was. He asked her to sit down and 
she did. He began to rub her back. The prosecutrix then testified 
that appellant rubbed her back, took her shirt off, and rubbed her 
back with lotion. He later took off her blue jeans, her underwear 
and her shoes and continued rubbing her body. She testified this 
made her feel relaxed. During this time the prosecutrix 
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made no effort to prevent him from doing so. After some time 
prosecutrix testified that they began to have intercourse (T. 25). 
After a while the prosecutrix testified that she attempted 
to get up and appellant rolled her over and asked her to perform 
oral sex. She testified that she said she wanted to go home 
(T. 26). She then testified that appellant asked her again to 
do it for him and that, although she tried to put up resistence, 
she was unable to (T. 26). She further testified that appellant 
started to put a Mikelob beer bottle inside of her but that she 
grabbed his arm and told him to stop and then "I told him I'd 
do what he wanted me to and so then I tried to do it for him" 
(T. 27). She testified she told him she loved him (T. 28) and 
that she performed this act for about an hour (T. 54). She 
also testified that when they were finished, she asked him to 
take her out to breakfast again (T. 29). After a while they 
went into the other room and fell asleep. 
The prosecutrix testified that when she woke up she was 
in bed, she put on her clothes and ran out of the house for three 
blocks. She made contact with an individual and asked to use 
the phone and immediately called her mother. At her father's 
suggestion, they decided to call the police (T. 30). 
The State presented testimony that Michelle Christiansen 
was taken to the hospital where the examining doctor found no 
evidence of sexual intercourse. At the hospital urine and blood 
samples were also taken from Michelle Christiansen. The blood 
- 4 -
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and urine were tested for the presence of trichloral ethanol, 
a metabolite of chloral hydrate. Trichloral ethanol was found 
in the urine and was found in the blood at the level of 6.1 
micrograms per millileter. State's witness Brian Finkle testified 
that a level of 6.1 micrograms per millileter of trichloral 
ethanol in the blood would have indicated to him that there 
"must have had a blood concentration prior to that time very 
much higher and, indeed, much higher than anyone in my experience 
would achieve had they been prescribed this drug by a physician 
for medical purposes" (T. 104). This fact, however, is only 
true when the blood and the testing is kept under controlled 
circumstances which was not the case in the this instance. 
State's witness Ladislav Kopjak, chemist at the Center 
for Human Toxicology, University of Utah, testified (T. 94) that 
"because the drug trichloral ethanol is a volatile-type substance, 
such as alcohol, and if it's not refrigerated there is a chance 
that it could seep out from the vial and the tubes". Therefore, 
"The effect would be that the concentration that I reported 
in the blood would most likely have been higher because it was 
not refrigerated". 
Testimony from State's witnesses Pat Smith and Nurse 
McClintick (T. 77,78) indicated that viles had not been refriger-
ated between the period from the 27th of September, 1977, to 
some time after 3:45 p.m. on the 29th of September, 1977. Those 
combined facts showed that the reliability of the tests con-
- 5 -
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ducted, concerning the level of trichloral ethanol, were not 
all together established. The prosecutrix testified that during 
the time of the intercourse and oral sex she felt sleepy, tired 
and slightly dizzy. State's witness Lisa Don Thornwall, who 
also consumed a green capsule, testified she suffered no noticable 
effects from the capsule (T. 158). 
Appellant expressed concern about prosecutrix the next 
morning when he telephoned Diana Visick (T. 143) and offered to 
help try to find "Shelly" (T. 143). Appellant was arrested 
without resistance and was described as cooperative at all times 
(T. 130). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF FORCIBLE SODOMY. 
The standard for review of the sufficiency of the evidence 
for a conviction is that "it must appear that upon so viewing 
the evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant cotllIIlitted the crime". State 
v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (1977). 
But when the sufficiency of the evidence is being re-
viewed in a sex-offense conviction, 
There must be considered the ease of assertion 
of the forcible accomplishment of the sexual 
act, with impossibility of defense except by 
direct denial, or of the proneness of the woman, 
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when she finds the fact of her disgrace dis-
covered or likely of discovery to minimize 
her fault by asserting force or violence, which 
had led courts to hold to a very strict rule 
of proof in such cases. 
State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162 364 P 2d 109 
at 112 (1961). ' · 
The need for these added considerations in determining 
the sufficiency of the evidence in a sex-offense is that the un-
corroborated testimony of the prosecutrix will be enough to sus-
tain a conviction, State v. Hodges, 14 Utah 2d 197, 381 P.2d 81 
(1963). When the conviction is based upon the uncorroborated 
testimony of a single complaining witness the appellate Court 
must decide if the "evidence is so inherently improbable as to 
be unworthy of belief, that upon objective analysis, reasonable 
minds could not believe beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant 
was guilty of the offense charged". State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 
1272 (Utah, 1975). 
The essential elements of the crime of forcible sodomy 
are given in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-403 (1953 as amended). A 
person commits forcible sodomy when he engages in any sexual 
act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus 
of another person regardless of the sex of either participant, 
and when that is committed upon another without the other's con-
sent. Consent in a sex offense is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-406 (1953 as amended). The subsections applicable in 
this case include: 
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(1) When the actor compels the victim to 
submit or participate by force that overcomes 
such earnest resistance as might reasonably 
be expected under the circumstances; or 
(2) The actor compels the victim to submit 
or participate by any threat that would pre-
vent resistance by a person of ordinary 
resolution. 
Finally, the State has the burden of proving the lack of consent 
as an element of the crime. State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 
P.2d 865 (1959). 
POINT A 
THE PROSECUTRIX'S STORY IS INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE 
AND BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE CORROBORATING 
HER CLAIM OF A LACK OF CONSENT, THE EVIDENCE IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
In this case the appellant was convicted on the uncor-
roborated testimony of the prosecutrix. But the prosecutrix's 
testimony is so inherently improbable that it is unworthy of be-
lief. Thus, under State v. Mills, supra, this evidence is insuf-
ficient to support a conviction. 
The prosecutrix's testimony was replete with inconsisten-
cies and contradictions making her testimony improbable, and con-
sequently unworthy of belief. 
The major inconsistencies in the prosecutrix's testimony 
are those when she described her own condition on the night of 
the incident. She stated that the reason she would not resist 
the appellant, by actions or by words, was that she was dizzy 
(T. 24) and that "I was asleep" and "didn't have any control 
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over my muscles" (T. 25,26). However, she also stated that just 
prior to this incident, she was able to walk from appellant's 
mother's house to the other apartment, she was able to use the 
bathroom by herself, and after she had slept on the couch, she 
got off the couch to go to the doorway with him and could walk 
at that time. In the middle of all of the actions by appellant, 
the prosecutrix testified she was able to sit up and, that at 
one point, she grabbed his arm away (T. 27). Also, after they 
had finished, she walked back into the bedroom by herself. 
Further, during this time she testified she was too weak and 
too dizzy to scream or yell out. However, she testified about 
a continuous conversation with the appellant (T. 27,28). 
Because of these inconsistencies in the crucial aspects 
of her testimony concerning her ability to resist appellant's 
advances, the prosecutrix's story that the appellant forced her 
to engage in sodomy without her consent is inherently improbable. 
Thus without further corroboration, the prosecutrix's testimony 
of her failure to consent to the sodomy is insufficient as a 
matter of law to support a conviction. 
The prosecutrix testified as to having two small bruises 
on the inside of her legs, which bruises are consistent with 
consentual intercourse. Further, the jury found that appellant 
was not guilty of rape, in that the alleged intercourse was not 
without prosecutrix's consent. Those bruises are not inconsistent 
with consentual sodomy as well. There is absolutely no corrobor-
- 9 -
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ation in fact of prosecutrix's testimony that she was choked, 
pushed down hard on the floor, or grabbed by the arms. There 
is no physical corrobroation of the fact that any intercourse 
took place, nor that any sodomy took place. 
Dr. Evans, who examined the prosecutrix the morning of 
September 27, 1977, could not testify that the prosecutrix had 
even engaged in intercourse. He found no evidence of trauma to 
the genital area, nor to the mouth. He found no bruises or 
lacerations, or any other physical symptoms of forcible sodomy 
of intercourse or struggle. 
A third fact which prosecutrix testified to, but is un-
corroborated by any of the witnesses, is that of the appellant's 
anger or violence. The prosecutrix in this case is the only 
person who alleged that the appellant was anything but friendly, 
cooperative and concerned. Even the prosecutrix's own testimony 
described him as nice (T. 39) and concerned about her well-being 
(T. 23). Lisa Don Thornwall testified that the appellant was 
at all times nice and polite; Preston Truman did not testify to 
any violent acts by appellant; Diana Visick testified that the 
appellant expressed concern over the whereabouts of prosecutrix 
and agreed to begin to help search for her; Detective Pat Smith 
testified that the appellant was always cooperative and helpful 
during this investigation. All of these individuals saw the 
appellant just prior or just subsequently to the events to which 
the prosecutrix testified. None of these individuals corroborates 
-10-
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her claim that the appellant was very angry or, in fact, violent. 
Consequently, reasonably minds would entertain a reasonable doubt 
that the appellant committed the crime. The conviction for 
forcible sodomy must be reversed. 
POINT B 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CON-
VICTION AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE LACK OF CON-
SENT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF REASONABLY EXPECTED 
RESISTANCE TO BE OVERCOME BY FORCE AND THERE WAS 
NO EVIDENCE OF IMMEDIATE THREATS WHICH WOULD 
PREVENT RESISTANCE BY A PERSON OF ORDINARY 
RESOLUTION. 
Under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-406 (1953 as amended) a lack 
of consent may be demonstrated by showing either force that over-
comes a reasonable resistance or threats that would prevent 
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution. 
In State v. Horne, supra, the resistance that the law 
requires a woman make is no "more than her age, strength, the 
surrounding facts, and all attending circumstances make it reason-
able for her to do in order to manifest her opposition". Id at 
p. 111, 112. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court found the facts 
insufficient as a matter of law to support a convicton. The 
factors that the Court considered included: (1) during the period 
of time that the defendant was in her trailer the prosecutrix 
made no outcry; (2) the prosecutrix did not attempt to leave or 
seek help during the incident; (3) there was no evidence of marks 
or bruises; (4) there was no evidence of threats made either upon 
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the prosecutrix or her children; and (5) the length of time the 
prosecutrix waited before making a complaint. 
During the approximately three hours of interaction 
between appellant and prosecutrix, prosecutrix made no outcry. 
Although she testified she was weak, and later that he grabbed 
her mouth preventing her from screaming, she had been able to 
carry on a conversation with appellant during the same period of 
time. Furthermore, because she had walked in that neighborhood 
prior to being inside of the house, she was aware of the fact that 
it was a residential neighborhood and that there were houses and 
people close by in the surrounding area who could have heard the 
outcry. 
Secondly, the prosecutrix had ample opportunities to 
leave and seek help, but she did not avail herself of such 
opportunities. She was able to walk around the apartment freely 
from the time that she got there to the time when she finally 
left, as evidence by her own testimony. Within the apartment, 
she was able to walk to the bathroom, she was able to walk around 
the living room, and she was able to move under her own power 
to the bedroom. The prosecutrix's claimed that she was restrained 
at some point by the appellant. However, it should be observed 
that she performed oral sex upon appellant for one hour without 
attempting to get away and even when the whole episode was over, 
she made no attempt to run away. 
Thirdly, there was little or no evidence of a struggle. 
- 12 -
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The prosecutrix testified to two small bruises, which were not 
observed by the doctor. She had no bruises, no abraisions, no 
lacerations around the throat or face or the arms where she 
testified that she was grabbed and choked. She had no marks 
on her mouth where she said appellant grabbed her. She had no 
bruises on her back, although she claimed that she was thrown 
down forcefully on the floor. Prosecutrix admits she did not 
strike, kick or push away the appellant. She made no attempt 
at all, in fact, to fight him off. Prosecutrix testified 
appellant became angry and that made her afraid. She claimed 
she said "no" to the appellant. At the same time she was saying 
"no", however, she was also discussing going out to breakfast, 
which she stated that she suggested to appellant several times. 
That conversation, combined with the fact that there was no 
physical resistance, does not provide sufficient evidence to 
establish that the prosecutrix resisted any force asserted by 
the appellant, under the circumstances. 
Another factor in the Horne case was that there was no 
evidence that threats had been made. Here, the only claim 
prosecutrix made of a threat was when she claimed the appellant 
told her that she would be sorry if she didn't go along with it. 
This case is distinguishable from State v. Cederstrom, Utah 
Supreme Court No. 14777 (December, 1977), in that the prosecutrix 
in Cederstrom claimed that the defendant displayed a knife, a 
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screw driver, or other similar object when making the threat 
that she would be hurt. Here no weapon was displayed. No weapon 
was ever found. In fact, the prosecutrix did not testify that 
appellant had a weapon or threatened to use a weapon. Similarly, 
this case is distinguishable from State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700 
(1977). In the Studham case, this Court found several facts 
which in totality added to the circumstances and sustained the 
conviction on the grounds that under those circumstances, the 
prosecutrix had resisted force sufficient to meet the standards 
in the Horne case. In that case, the evidence showed that 
the prosecutrix had a young son in the apartment and that she had 
a bruise or cut on her lip. The prosecutrix had testified that 
defendant had told her that she would not live to be past the 
age of twenty-one. The threats, combined with the concern of 
the safety of the young child and the bruises or cut on her lip, 
were sufficient to show that the prosecutrix had acted reasonably 
under the circumstances. This case is distinguishable, however, 
on several grounds. First of all, the prosecutrix had no young 
son or other person to protect besides herself. Secondly, 
prosecutrix did not testify to any threats made by appellant 
to her. Thirdly, prosecutrix displayed no signs of physical 
injury or traumas, such that might be expected if one had resisted 
force. It must be remembered in this case, the prosecutrix is 
seventeen years old and in reasonably good health. She had 
not been forced to go any place that she did not want to go. 
- 14 -
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She was aware of the surrounding area in which these events 
tood place. Yet in this case, the prosecutrix put up no re-
sistance, physically, and other than the words, "No, I want to 
go home", gave very little indication of lack of consent. When 
she agreed to perform oral sex she continued for one hour. All 
of these factors sustain the implication that if any intercourse 
or acts of sodomy occurred, they were only with the consent of 
the prosecutrix under these circumstances. 
On the basis of these facts, a reasonable mind would 
entertain a reasonable doubt that there was a lack of consent 
on the part of the prosecutrix, and judgment must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case is insufficient for the 
appellant to be convicted of forcible sodomy. The appellant 
made no threat that would have prevented the prosecutrix's re-
sistance. The prosecutrix's lack of consent was not evidence 
by resistance reasonable for her age, strength, the surrounding 
facts and attending circumstances. The prosecutrix did not 
resist in any way reasonably expected under the circumstances. 
At no time did she make an attempt to leave the residence, 
nor did she make an attempt to attract the attention of others. 
At no time prior to sexual intercourse by the prosecutrix's 
testimony, did she intimate that she did not desire to partici-
pate in the act of intercourse. She suffered no cuts, bruises, 
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or abrasions; she suffered no damage to her clothing as a result 
of the incident. Consequently, there is a reasonable doubt that 
the appellant engaged in the act of forcible sodomy. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G. L. FLETCHER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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